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The enhanced develop-ment of information and communication technologies in govern-ment has created new 
opportunities for agencies to collect, 
share and re-use data. At the same 
time, the commercial worth of gov-
ernmental data sets and value-added 
information products/services have 
increased [1]. Government agencies 
are fi nding that data they have rou-
tinely collected to fulfi l their statu-
tory and business functions can now 
more easily be re-used for commer-
cial  purposes [2]. 
The prospect of increasing reve-
nue through the commercial re-use 
of public sector information (PSI) is 
clearly appealing for governments 
and their agencies. Examples of PSI 
that have been re-used commecially 
include residential property transac-
tion details, land title information, 
ordanance survey data and street 
address registers. However, the 
commercial re-use of PSI raises a 
key question about the  technocratic 
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public administrations of the  future: 
what happens to e-government 
 organizations when they move from 
being service  providers to market-
oriented, income generators? This 
change could generate a re-bal-
ancing of government priorities, a 
rebalance that will favor income 
generation policies over previously 
held democratic norms that defi ned 
the scope, nature, and boundaries 
of the relationship between govern-
ments and their citizens [3]. More-
over, a paradigmatic change of 
 governmental ethos could also raise 
security concerns. The enhanced 
publication of PSI, particularly for 
income-generation purposes, could 
lead to confl icts within and be-
tween government agencies regard-
ing the restriction and distribution 
of  information.
These shifting priorities become 
more apparent when the commer-
cial re-use of PSI is considered in 
the context of the information pri-
vacy legal obligations placed upon 
agencies. Ultimately, the shifting 
boundaries will infl uence the shape 
of and prospects for a transpar-
ant and open information society, 
which in turn will infl uence notions 
of national security. 
This article examines those 
shifting boundaries, particularly 
in light of information privacy and 
national security concerns arising 
from governmental commercial-
ization of PSI that includes per-
sonal information. I seek to show 
that information privacy laws can 
be subverted in the face of overt 
commercialization by government 
agencies; that commercialization 
can have a negative impact on in-
dividuals; and can also give rise to 
societal concerns relating to pri-
vacy, security, and the open gover-
nance of the information society. 
Reuse of PSI
The re-use of PSI reflects the 
 important role that govenmental 
information dissemination has with 
regards to the functioning of open, 
civil societies. Dissimilar political 
 perspectives have different priori-
ties regarding the conceptual un-
derpinnings of PSI re-use that can 
be categorized by two competing 
public goods: open access to gov-
ernment information and the re-use 
of PSI as an income generator for 
both the public and private sectors. 
Existing re-use policies encapsu-
late both of these competing goods 
in an attempt to balance the com-
plexities of governmental informa-
tion dissemination, particularly via 
commercialization strategies. This 
competing balance results in poli-
cies that have clear philosophical 
statements about their intent that is 
not necessarily matched in  clarity 
by the application of day-to-day 
practices, as evidenced in the ap-
proaches adopted by the EU, the 
U.S., and Australia. 
First, it is important to ac-
knowledge the unique position 
that governments have as a collec-
tors of public data [4]. Agencies 
have statutory means to enforce 
disclosure and they are the only 
feasible providers of comprehen-
sive national data sets [5, p. 227]. 
Nonetheless, defi ning PSI is not a 
simple task due to the inherent ten-
sions between a citizen’s right of 
public access to government infor-
mation and the economic benefi ts 
that arise from the commercializa-
tion of public sector information [6, 
p. 2]. These philosophical differ-
ences are evident in the commercial 
re-use of PSI policies that have been 
developed in the EU and the U.S. 
During the course of the last two 
decades, EU policy objectives have 
defi ned PSI in different ways to re-
fl ect different policy and economic 
ambitions [7]. The fi rst attempt 
to instigate an EU-wide policy on 
PSI was developed in 1989 [8]. It 
sought to synergize public and pri-
vate sector initiatives to stimulate 
economic growth in a Europe-wide 
information market.
The European Commission at-
tempted initiatives during the next 
13 years, and the commercial re-
use of PSI remained on the policy 
agenda [9]–[12], despite the inher-
rent political, administrative, and 
technical complexities of develop-
ing an EU-wide strategy, such as 
different national administrative 
rules, digital formats, and pricing 
regimes [13, p. 195].
In 2003, the Commission imple-
mented “Directive 2003/98/ec of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 November 2003 on 
the Reuse of Public Sector Informa-
tion,” to encourage the commercial 
re-use of PSI throughout the EU 
member states [8]. The Directive 
provided a governance framework 
to alleviate the problems encoun-
tered during the previous decades. 
The Commission’s economic in-
tent was established via a general 
principle of commercial re-use, 
namely “whenever public sector 
information is generally accessible, 
commercial re-use should be con-
sidered.” However, the commercial 
re-use of PSI was still left to the 
discretion of member state gov-
ernments which made it virtually 
impossible to implement a unifi ed, 
EU-wide PSI framework [14, p.12]. 
The Directive was also solely con-
cerned with the public sector and 
no conditions were placed upon pri-
vate sector information brokers [14, 
p. 12]. The Directive also created 
income generation opportunities for 
government agencies by allowing 
public sector bodies to make prof-
its from the commercial re-use of 
their PSI [15, Art. 14]. Government 
agencies could therefore attempt to 
recover costs as long as any charge 
was a “reasonable return on invest-
ment” and was not “excessive.”
The Directive has come un-
der some criticism. For example, 
Blakemore and Craglia [6, p. 3] 
state that the Directive is “ based on 
an untested assumption that there 
is a latent demand for informa-
tion that is unfulfi lled because of 
technological and policy ‘barriers’ 
that therefore need to be removed.” 
Several authors have also criticized 
the overt economic interests of the 
EU’s policies which overshadow 
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the information access rights of cit-
izens [7], [14], [16], [17]. As such, 
the commercial re-use of PSI is a 
market-oriented approach that has 
a rationalistic and linear viewpoint 
that overly focuses on technologies, 
information, and benefi ts but does 
not encapsulate the true complexi-
ties of the situation [6, p. 3]. 
The policy situation in the U.S., 
at least at the Federal level, is some-
what different. Unlike the EU, the 
dichotomy between the commercial 
re-use of PSI and the information 
access rights of citizens does not 
exist [18, p. 3]. The vast majority of 
Federal Government information is 
freely available to the private sec-
tor and the public. The purpose of 
this approach is to ensure that tax-
payers do not pay twice for govern-
ment information and to encourage 
the widest possible dissemination 
of information [16], [19]. 
Four existing laws form the 
PSI foundation of the U.S. Federal 
Government [20, p. 123]. The First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion guarantees freedom of speech 
and promotes open political dia-
logue. The First Amendment does 
not specifi cally preclude the Feder-
al Government from commercially 
re-using PSI but it sets a tone for 
prohibiting government interfer-
ence in the marketplace that has 
been followed by subsequent pieces 
of legislation [21], such as, rule 34 
of the Copyright Act 1976, which 
expressly prohibits copyright pro-
tection of Federal Government 
works. The effect of the legislation 
is to place all Federal Government 
information in the public domain 
[21]. The public interest is served 
“by keeping governmentally cre-
ated works as free as possible of 
potential restrictions on dissemi-
nation” [20, p. 126]. However, the 
 prohibition of copyright does not 
extend to state governments who 
are allowed to copyright their data 
and can therefore commercially 
 re-use information held by them. 
The U.S. Freedom of Informa-
tion Act of 1966 ensures public 
access to government information. 
The Act permits any person to re-
quest any record in the possession 
of a federal agency in order to es-
tablish a culture of disclosure for 
government records [20, p. 124]. In 
1996, amendments were introduced 
to refl ect technological changes 
and the advent of electronic record-
keeping. Accordingly, if an agency 
receives three or more requests 
for the same records, it is obliged 
to make the information available 
on its website thus adding a wider 
information dissemination purpose 
to the public access aims of the leg-
islation [20, p. 125]. The fi nal piece 
of legislation, the Paperwork Re-
duction Act 1995, aims to prevent 
bureaucratic control of information 
by directing agencies to ensure that 
information is disseminated to the 
public in a timely and equitable 
manner. A key purpose of the legis-
lation is to ensure that government 
does not have a monopoly over its 
information and thus prevents an 
agency from commercially re- using 
its own PSI [20, p. 130]. 
The Australian situation, again 
at the Federal level, is philosophi-
cally less clear-cut as there appears 
to be no coherent or overriding PSI 
policy agenda. The “Intellectual 
Property Principles for Australian 
Government Agencies” [22] pro-
vides “a broad policy framework 
for intellectual property mange-
ment” that covers a wide range of 
works produced by the Common-
wealth. Agencies are nonetheless 
encouraged to develop their own 
individual intellectual property 
management frameworks that re-
fl ect their own needs and objec-
tives. While the principles provide 
an overarching guideline for Com-
monwealth agencies, the ultimate 
form of implementation is left to 
the agencies themselves. 
The Australian Principles 11 to 
15 are particularly relevant to the 
issue of commercializing PSI. Prin-
ciple 11 states that agencies “should 
encourage public use and easy ac-
cess to copyright material” that is 
primary to the function of govern-
ment. This is similar to the access 
right provisions of both the EU and 
the U.S. which deem fundamental 
government information should be 
made freely available. However, 
the use of the words “should en-
courage” is by no means as strong 
as the obligations that U.S. Federal 
Government agencies must com-
ply with. Principle 13 states that 
Commonwealth agencies should 
be responsive to opportunities for 
commercial use and exploitation of 
intellectual property. Furthermore, 
agencies should consider the poten-
tial benefi ts that may be realized 
through commercialization oppor-
tunities with the private sector. The 
Intellectual Property Principles 
recognize the importance of mak-
ing core government information 
freely available (like the U.S. and 
the EU) and offer a watered down 
version of the EU’s marketization 
strategy. 
In summary, policies regard-
ing the commercialization of PSI 
 differ. Policies are marked by 
philosophical underpinnings that 
balance open access to government 
information with considerations 
about the role of the private and 
public sector in the information 
Government policies balance 
open access to government 
information with considerations 
about the role of the private 
and public sector in the 
information economy.
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economy. Considerations about the 
information economy can trans-
form traditional notions about the 
role of government as an informa-
tion disseminator, a transformation 
that can give rise to privacy and 
 security concerns.
Information 
Privacy Concerns
A diffi culty arises for government 
agencies considering the commer-
cial re-use of PSI: the principle of 
consent is fundamental to infor-
mation privacy and data protec-
tion laws. Information privacy 
laws consign upon data collectors 
various constraints that govern the 
collection, use, and dissemination 
of personal information. Informa-
tion privacy ensures that informa-
tion about an individual is kept 
 confi dential and is only used for 
purposes to which that person has 
consented [23]. Within the context 
of governmental commercializa-
tion of information, an analysis of 
information privacy issues is in-
tegral to resolving the tensions of 
trust that arise from enhanced use 
of technologies by governments 
and the anxieties of citizens regard-
ing the use to which their personal 
information is put [24, p. 13]
These tensions are likely to 
arise in commercialization be-
cause  personal data will be used 
for a  different purpose than that for 
which it was collected, namely gov-
ernmental income generation. In the 
case of commercialization of PSI, 
the “primary purpose” of data col-
lection fulfi ls the agencies’ legisla-
tive obligations and fulfi ls an essen-
tial administrative function of the 
agency. However, when an agency 
attempts to commercially re-use its 
information, including personal in-
formation, either as raw data or as 
value added information/product, 
it does so for a “secondary commer-
cial purpose.” An individual has 
consented to the primary purpose, 
but may not have consented to, or 
even been aware of, the secondary 
commercial purpose thus exacacer-
bating those tensions of trust high-
lighted above. 
Do government agencies have 
the legal right to collect and to re-
use personally related information 
for income generation purposes? 
The key concern is whether agencies 
can legitimately claim a secondary 
commercial purpose for re-using 
personally related information, 
 either via the consent received from 
individuals or from an existing leg-
islative exemption. Two examples 
of PSI re-use problems from the 
U.S. and the U.K. highlight the ten-
sions between citizens and govern-
ment agencies regarding the re-use 
of personal information for income 
generation purposes. 
In the 2005 U.S. case Kehoe v 
Fidelity Federal Bank & Trust 
[25], a class action was brought 
against the Fidelity Bank regarding 
its purchase of 565 600 names and 
addresses from the Florida State 
Government’s Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV). Upon purchase, 
the Bank used the DMV’s informa-
tion to mass mail Florida residents 
about car loan advertisements. This 
act was in direct contravention of 
the Federal Drivers Privacy Pro-
tection Act (DPPA) [26], which 
requires state governments to pro-
tect the privacy of an individual’s 
personal information contained in 
motor vehicle records.
The DPPA was enacted in 1993 
to deter would-be stalkers from 
gaining access to victims via pub-
licly listed motor vehicle records. A 
further amendment was enacted in 
1999 that required a state DMV to 
obtain the consent of any individu-
al whose driver license was being 
sold for bulk marketing purposes. 
In the Kehoe case, the plaintiffs’ 
consent was required before the 
DMV could re-use and sell their 
information to the Bank. However, 
the 1999 amendment, which was 
enacted in 2000 by the Florida 
legislature, was never updated into 
Florida law due to an oversight. As 
such, driver license information 
continued to be used for commer-
cial purposes without consent. The 
U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida found for the 
Bank at fi rst instance because the 
plaintiffs could not demonstrate 
that the Bank’s breach of the DPPA 
caused them actual harm. The 
plaintiffs appealed to the 11th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and the court 
overturned the decision holding 
that it was not a requirement under 
the DPPA to prove actual harm for 
a claim of damages. The Bank was 
required to pay $US50 million to 
the plaintiffs for using their per-
sonal information for marketing 
purposes without their consent.
Also in 2005, the U.K. Gov-
ernment’s Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency (DVLA) en-
countered problems selling driver 
license information. The DVLA 
is  responsible for collecting data 
on persons who have been issued a 
U.K. driving license and for vehi-
cles registered within the U.K. For 
a small sum, the DVLA routinely 
sold its driver license information 
to certain companies related to 
the regulation of parking offences, 
such as car park managers and car 
clamping fi rms. For an extra charge 
of around £3000, the DVLA autho-
rized direct access to its database 
system which allowed companies 
to type in a registration number 
and to download corresponding 
personal information about the reg-
istered car owner [27]. The DVLA 
claimed that it was obliged to com-
mercially re-use its PSI because of 
a 2002 statutory instrument that 
required the organization to sell 
information to anyone with “a rea-
sonable cause” [27].
Despite the fact that only com-
panies with a reasonable cause were 
supposed to access the DVLA’s 
database, the agency authorized 
access to one of Europe’s largest 
credit card companies, who are 
were known to employ extensive di-
rect mailing tactics, on the pretense 
that the company had a reasonable 
cause because it owned a private car 
park at its central offi ce [28]. More 
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worryingly, the DVLA also sold its 
information to a private car clamp-
ing fi rm whose directors were found 
guilty of blackmailing unsuspecting 
motorists. The blackmailers sent 
threatening letters to victims citing 
their registration details and claim-
ing that a spurious parking violation 
had taken place [27]. Subsequent 
critical media coverage about the 
DVLA’s commercial activities led to 
the Department of Transport, which 
houses the DVLA under its ac-
countability framework, to respond 
by establishing a public review and 
consultation exercise [29]. The re-
view resulted in 14 new measures 
including detailed guidance on 
what constitutes a reasonable cause, 
a requirement for organizations to 
be members of an accredited trade 
association and the instigation of a 
new complaints procedure.
Several points of interest arise 
from the Kehoe and the DVLA 
examples. The construction of 
the DPPA is unusual in the con-
text of information privacy and 
data protection laws. The DPPA 
was established to deter would be 
stalkers and it therefore obliges 
the buyers, rather than the col-
lectors (or sellers) of data, to act 
within certain confi nes. As such, 
in Kehoe, an action was brought 
against the Bank but no action was 
brought against the Florida DMV. 
Contrast that with the DVLA ex-
ample, where the agency received 
voluble criticism that resulted in a 
consultation review of its actions 
and the implementation of stricter 
guidelines to correct its informa-
tion re-selling practices. 
Both examples provide differ-
ent methods of obtaining consent 
but both failed to supply an effec-
tive means of privacy protection 
regarding the commercial re-use 
of personally related PSI. For ex-
ample, section 2721 of the DPPA 
indicates the purposes for which 
motor vehicle records can be used. 
This includes a provision for mass 
mailing solicitations if the infor-
mation provider has obtained the 
express consent from the individu-
als named in the mailing list. If an 
individual has not provided con-
sent to the release of his/her mo-
tor vehicle record for the purpose 
of mass mailings then the DPPA 
prohibits the use of their data in 
that specifi c way [30]. In the Kehoe 
case, the consent requirement was 
inadvertently not enacted and the 
DMV continued to sell its informa-
tion without restriction. 
In the DVLA example, only in-
terested parties (i.e., those with a 
reasonable cause) should have been 
able to gain access to a driver’s 
personal information. However, as 
detailed above, the practical defi ni-
tion of “a reasonable cause” was so 
broad that it allowed illegitimate 
access by companies, and once in-
formation was accessed, there was 
practically no restriction placed on 
the use of the information. The im-
plicit assumption behind the DV-
LA’s commercial actions was that 
individual drivers had consented 
to any re-use of their information. 
This was clearly not the case as 
witnessed by the widespread criti-
cism heaped on the DVLA after the 
media broke the story. 
Both cases represent a failure 
of government agencies to obtain 
individual consent for a second-
ary commercial purpose. This 
illustrates a disturbing lack of 
concern for  information privacy 
issues that arise from governmen-
tal commercialization of personal 
information and for the potential 
negative effects on individuals.
National Security 
Implications
The Kehoe and DVLA examples 
underline information privacy con-
cerns at an individual level. Nation-
al security concerns also arise from 
the commercialization of PSI at a 
governmental and societal level.
It is worth noting just how 
cheaply personal information was 
being sold in both cases. In Kehoe, 
the Bank paid $US5656 for the per-
sonal information of more than half 
a million Florida residents which 
approximates to only one cent for 
each name and address they bought. 
The DVLA sold details of individu-
als for only £2.50 per record. Nev-
ertheless, the DVLA earned £6.3 
million in 2005 from its commer-
cial re-use of personal information 
[31] which gives a clear indication 
of just how many records were rou-
tinely being re-used and sold. Fur-
thermore, evidence from the U.S. 
has also suggested that state-based 
DMV’s have been susceptible to 
fraud, corruption, and weak secu-
rity practices [32]. For example, 
in December 2003 a former state 
employee from the Nevada DMV 
pleaded guilty to receiving bribes 
totaling more than $US300 000 to 
provide unauthorized identifi cation 
documents to  illegal immigrants. 
In June 2002, 36 people, includ-
ing DMV staff, were indicted in 
a complex criminal operation that 
involved the fraudulent issue of 
New Jersey driving licenses. The 
criminals involved were so sophis-
ticated, and the demand so great, 
that different brokers competed 
against each other to provide the 
best choice of illegal services at a 
price to suit [33].
These cases shows the com-
mercial value of driving license 
personal information. In the case 
of the  “legitimate” sales of the 
Florida DMV and the DVLA, the 
commercial value exists because of 
the potential uses for which third 
parties can utilize the information 
through direct marketing. In the 
case of fraudulent or other crimi-
nal acts, a commercial value ex-
ists for the provision of fraudulent 
identifi cation that can be used to 
dishonestly confi rm a false identi-
ty. Although the reasons behind the 
agency sales and the criminal acts 
are very different, they nonetheless 
provide consequential threats for 
national security because both situ-
ations provide greater access to the 
fundamental material of identity 
theft—personal information that 
can, with relative ease, be recycled 
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into a fraudulent identity. In fact, it 
is astonishing at a time when iden-
tity theft is fast becoming a major 
crime concern in most fi rst world 
countries, that both agencies were 
selling personal information at 
basement store prices, and more 
worryingly, paid scant regard to 
whom they were providing it. It 
would appear from the two exam-
ples highlighted, that commercial 
reasons, whether directly or indi-
rectly, outweighed the potential 
threats of national security arising 
from the misuse of personal infor-
mation for identity theft crimes.
Issues regarding the governmen-
tal commercialization of personal 
information, particularly driver li-
cense data, may therefore impact 
upon national security concerns. 
While governments have recognized 
the security issues arising from the 
identifi cation purposes of drivers’ li-
censes, they have not been as quick 
to recognize the concerns that may 
arise through the commercializa-
tion of driving  license information. 
Legislative and technical responses 
have tended to focus on the con-
struction of more robust forms of 
license that can be used for identi-
fi cation purposes, as exemplifi ed by 
the Real ID Act in the U.S., and the 
Queensland Smart Driving License 
in Australia. However, the personal 
data from licenses has been, and 
continues to be, sold to commercial 
entities and other  bodies. 
This situation creates a para-
doxical situation. Governments 
throughout the world are setting 
aside large amounts of fi nancial, 
legislative, and technical resources 
to create stronger forms of driver 
license identifi cation. Yet the in-
formation behind those licenses is 
commercially available at inexpen-
sive prices. As highlighted above, 
the DVLA received just criticism 
regarding its commercial practices 
that infringed on individual privacy 
and that provided foundational sup-
port for criminal fraud. Those same 
criticisms are equally applicable to 
national security concerns. 
It should also be recognized that 
governmental commercial infor-
mation transactions with legitimate 
sources (e.g., information brokers), 
still give rise to national security 
issues, due to the reduction of con-
trol that government agencies have 
over information once it has been 
sold to a commercial third party. 
While a government agency can 
license certain uses that its in-
formation should and should not 
be put to, the ultimate decision 
about whom a commercial third 
party sells information to resides 
with the third party. It also has to 
be acknowledged that there are 
potentially less stringent checks 
and requirements imposed on a 
private sector information broker 
in comparison to a public sector, 
government agency. In effect, once 
governmental information is dis-
tributed for sale, it is diffi cult for 
governments to control to whom it 
is ultimately sold, or to restrict its 
use. That said, it is clearly unac-
ceptable for a government agency 
to provide, let alone sell, personal 
information to an illegal or illegiti-
mate source.
Privacy and National 
Security Issues
The Kehoe and DVLA examples 
highlight the volume of PSI that 
is commercially re-used for gov-
ernmental income generation pur-
poses. This raises implications for 
the prospect of an open, transpar-
ent, and secure information society. 
A balancing of societal interests is 
required which refl ects the differ-
ing priorities within governments 
and their effects on individuals. 
On one side of the scale, we have 
the societal interest arising from 
access to government information 
whether it is in the form of free and 
open access to enhance democracy, 
or whether it is in the form of the 
commercial re-use of PSI to en-
hance the information economy. 
On the other side, we have the so-
cietal interest arising from the trust 
relationship between citizens and 
their governments, a relationship 
which is founded upon the keystone 
notion of information privacy. Both 
interests represent competing val-
ues involving the requirements of 
economically self-suffi cient gov-
ernments to sell, restrict, and dis-
tribute their information versus the 
individual citizen’s right to access 
and to control the use and re-use 
of their personal information. The 
complex reconciliation of these 
interests is further compounded 
when issues of national security are 
added to the mix. 
It is easier to identify the con-
fl icting societal interests entailed 
in the commercial re-use of PSI 
and the information privacy of citi-
zens than it is to harmonize these 
competing concerns, especially in 
light of national security issues. A 
balance will not be found by sim-
ply examining and updating PSI, 
information privacy and national 
security legislation. Current laws 
do not adequately refl ect the con-
ceptual complexity and the demo-
cratic importance of maintaining 
a balance between open access to 
government information, govern-
mental income generation through 
the commercial re-use of PSI, the 
information privacy of citizens, 
and the national security require-
ments of governments. 
All of this requires government 
agencies to pay careful attention 
to privacy and national security 
issues when making decisions to 
commercialize PSI held under their 
custodianship. Both the Kehoe 
and the DVLA examples highlight 
concerns that can arise from the 
The principle of consent is 
fundamental to information privacy 
and data protection laws.
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 commercialization of PSI and the 
negative consequences that can 
emerge for government agencies 
that have an overt income genera-
tion outlook. The advent of wide-
spread identity-related crimes and 
increased terrorist threats place 
greater requirements on govern-
ment agencies to think carefully 
before they adopt new PSI com-
mercialization strategies or re-en-
gage in existing commercial trans-
actions. Otherwise advanced and 
unchecked marketization of gov-
ernment information could have a 
detrimental effect on both individ-
ual privacy and national  security.
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